Keeping the politics out of the situation, what do ya'll think?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/30/AR2006113001637.html

Paperless electronic voting machines used throughout the Washington region and much of the country "cannot be made secure," according to draft recommendations issued this week by a federal agency that advises the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

The assessment by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, one of the government's premier research centers, is the most sweeping condemnation of such voting systems by a federal agency.

What Paper Record?

In a report hailed by critics of electronic voting, NIST said that voting systems should allow election officials to recount ballots independently from a voting machine's software. The recommendations endorse "optical-scan" systems in which voters mark paper ballots that are read by a computer and electronic systems that print a paper summary of each ballot, which voters review and elections officials save for recounts.

Voters in Maryland cast ballots on electronic machines that produce no paper record of each vote; in the District and Loudoun County, voters can choose between using such machines and optical-scan systems. Other Northern Virginia jurisdictions, and many counties across the state, use electronic voting systems exclusively.

NIST's recommendations are to be debated next week before the Technical Guidelines Development Committee, charged by Congress to develop standards for voting systems. To become effective, NIST's recommendations must then be adopted by the Election Assistance Commission, which was created by Congress to promote changes in election systems after the 2000 debacle in Florida.

If the commission agrees with NIST, the practical impact may not be felt until 2009 or 2010, the soonest that new standards would be implemented. The standards that the Election Assistance Commission will adopt are voluntary, but most states require election officials to deploy voting systems that meet national or federal criteria.

State election officials in Maryland and Virginia declined to comment yesterday on the NIST report, which they were reviewing.

Alice P. Miller, executive director of the District's Board of Elections and Ethics, said through a spokesman that she would not comment because she is a member of the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.

NIST says in its report that the lack of a paper trail for each vote "is one of the main reasons behind continued questions about voting system security and diminished public confidence in elections." The report repeats the contention of the computer security community that "a single programmer could 'rig' a major election."

Fears about rigging have animated critics for years, but there has been no conclusive evidence that such fraud has occurred. Electronic voting systems have had technical problems -- including unpredictable screen freezes -- leaving voters wondering whether their ballots were properly recorded.

Computer scientists and others have said that the security of electronic voting systems cannot be guaranteed and that election officials should adopt systems that produce a paper record of each vote in case of a recount. The NIST report embraces that critique, introducing the concept of "software independence" in voting systems.

NIST says that voting systems should not rely on a machine's software to provide a record of the votes cast. Some electronic voting system manufacturers have introduced models that include printers to produce a separate record of each vote -- and that can be verified by a voter before leaving the machine -- but such paper trails have had their own problems.

Printers have jammed or otherwise failed, causing some election directors to question whether a paper trail is an improvement. Maryland state elections administrator Linda Lamone, in an undated video snippet that her critics have circulated on the Internet, says that voter verification is unnecessary. "I'm not going to put this paper on my machines -- it'll be over my dead body, because I just don't think it works. It really is a false sense of security," she said.

For critics of paperless electronic voting, the report is vindication. "I think I got it right," said Aviel Rubin, a Johns Hopkins University computer scientist who has long questioned the security and reliability of some electronic voting systems.

Linda Schade, a founder of TrueVoteMD, which has pressed for a system that provides a verifiable paper record of each vote, said, "These strong statements from a credible institution such as NIST add yet another voice to the consensus that paper electronic voting as used in states like MD is not secure. We hope that the [Election Assistance Commission] formally adopts these improved standards."

Even critics of paperless electronic voting have grown disenchanted with the practical problems of adding printers to electronic "touch-screen" voting machines.

"Why are we doing this at all? is the question people are asking," said Warren Stewart, policy director of VoteTrustUSA, a group critical of electronic voting systems. "We have a perfectly good system -- the paper-ballot optical-scan system."

Well in the UK no machines are used at all in the casting or counting of ballots. We take our pens and mark the box next to the candidate that we support. Simple and effective and even in our general election we tend to have all our results within 48 hours.

When the ballots are being hand counted candidates and the representatives are free to walk around and watch people counting. This system works so well.

Fair enough the USA has a much larger land area and higher numbers of people voting, though a lower percentage of total population voting, but the USA's election results don't immediatley take effect where as in the UK the results are effective immediatley (the exisitng Prime Minister has to leave his house in downing street within 24 hours of losing).

It really does seem to be a case of KISS

Last election, I voted early (electronic voting). They were slow, so I posed some basic questions to the election officials (great people, from both parties). “How does the system prevent duplicate early electronic voting, as there are multiple locations? Any electronic records information available? Are there redundant systems?” I stopped with these three questions, as by the blank, dumbnified looks on their faces, I think Elvis had walked in behind me. :lol:

I am involved with one of the major parties. I was at a district meeting, where there were individuals who could make calls for things to happen on a state level. They were discussing the lack of electronic voting two years ago. I stated they needed to generate an FAQ regarding electronic voting. Their response was “what are the questions?”. I would submit the other party probably is not that far off either.

They could not even address providing answers, as they did not know what the questions are.

Consider the profound efficiency of the current system. By 9-10pm on Election Night, all the Precincts (of a sufficient nature) had compiled, tallied, authenticated by both parties, summarized, etc. the results of paper ballot system. That just amazes me.

I’m a pretty forward thinking guy. But until they address some basic issues, I’m going back to the paper ballots.

Up here is the great white north :notme:
we just had our munipical elections, mayors, councillors and school trustees.
It was done electronically. The election ballot has a broken arrow that you need to connect for your desired candidate (similar sample attached)
correct me if I'm wrong the ballot get's scan (optical scan) to read the connected arrow and simultaneously sent to Elections Canada for tallying.

Now the Federal or provincial election are totally different (why? I do not know). They still employ the mark an "X" on your corresponding candidate and drop into ballot box, and the results are manually counted at closing.

:2cents:

The election ballot has a broken arrow that you need to connect for your desired candidate (similar sample attached)
correct me if I'm wrong the ballot get's scan (optical scan) to read the connected arrow and simultaneously sent to Elections Canada for tallying.

:2cents:

Thanks for the scan document, and the observation. In your situation, your vote is hand-marked, then it is scanned for tabulation. The difference is that if there is a problem with the scanner (and innocent problems do occur), the original document you and everyone else marked can be re-scanned. Too, if anyone cries foul about voting results, they can match the # of hand-marked ballots to the signatures on the voting book. Sure it's not perfect and fool-proof, but there is a backup system that exists.

The electronic voting machines I am speaking of are totally electronic. You sign the voting book, and they print you an entry # for the touch -screen. There is a touch-screen that you choose the candidate and hit enter. You don't get a receipt or anything. If they would just give me a receipt with some reference #, I would feel a little better.

"The electronic voting machines I am speaking of are totally electronic. You sign the voting book, and they print you an entry # for the touch -screen."


This is an awesome system Brad. I too would like to see a system this way. But with the recent personal information and privacy act in place the ballot could be link to the electorate. While currently elections Canada would have no idea which candidate you selected.

In my area they had the voting machine that printed a receipt (of sorts) so there was the paper trail that I could verify. In the event of a recount they will count the paper receipts and not the electronic votes. It gave me a higher confidence in the machine. I just don't have too much confidence in the system itself.

I used touch-screen electronic machines in the last two elections. You get recorded in a paper ledger when you sign in to vote. The number in the ledger is entered into the voting machine by a poll worker as they activate the machine to take your vote. When you are all done, there is a review process. If anything is out of the ordinary, such as you missed a vote for an office or issue, it is flagged for you to confirm your choice. Once you vote, you can watch as your ballot receipt is printed. The paper stays sealed inside the machine but you are still connected to your vote via the paper ledger #. I don't recall hearing any horror stories about paper jams, etc.

Ohio law considers the paper trail the "Real" vote. During a recent recount, no errors were found between paper and electronic record.

Check out the Pryce-Kilroy recount (http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2082&Itemid=113)