I read through all the responses but I have to admit that I would disagree with most everyone. No offense but the auditor that finally brought the hammer down was the first one correct and doing his job. It’s not a question of if the setup, training, and process was correct or not…it’s if there is documented evidence that it was. The consequence of failure on this part was deemed too high not to take this level of control.
“To me the problem is that the system described in my posts allowed for a greater, not lesser, chance of test failure due to a bad gage.”
I would say it is not a question of if there is a possibility of a test failure due to a possible bad gage, it is wither there is even a remote possibility of a failed part making it through the checks. If the gage showed bad upon return, the parts are still held (due to the gage failure, unknown if prior or after tests, or bad parts). Error is on the side of caution. This would be repeated until (after gage correction) it shows good. Parts never had a chance to get past though.
“There was a local cal lab that could have been used, but they were commercial and not nuclear approved...”
Good call, it’s the same as saying just used an uncertified lab for other uses. If they are not approved for the testing being done, it doesn’t count no matter how good they are. They don’t have the proper paperwork.
“I would like to know what data the customer used to make this decision. It seems to be an over reaction to some issue but I would like to know what data was used, if any, to justify the implementation and then continuation of this activity.”
Correct. There is probably not any data to justify this. That’s a good thing though. If they had data, every state downwind and on the same water table would know as well. Sarcastic, but we are talking nuclear here.
For any of these items talked about, what would be the legal response to an incident traced back to the part and the answer was “didn’t verify gage, unapproved lab etc”.