You need to document each hazardous situation applicable to your device. You mention at least two hazardous situations above. Since we here don't know the details of what your device does, we can't tell you what to include or not. Just try to go with your gut and keep the patient in mind as you go through this.
If you see multiple hazardous situations, which I do too, these need to be documented separately.
The risk control measure is the same for all of them, so should be listed against each one.
The hazard is different for each one as a different source of harm.
The fluid ingress is consistent to all.
I see "device surface becomes live" as one hazardous situation, and "device stops provision of therapy" as another, and the third regarding the device being out of service is being unable to treat the patient.
I think the root of this goes to the reason I started this thread in the first place - "hazard" and "hazardous situation" are so poorly defined in terms of where they sit within the "sequence of risk" that interpretation is wildly different.
And the various other standards that require you to follow the 14971 framework define hazardous situation differently, with 62366 being the worst in my opinion and 60601-1-8 incorporating further elements such as onset of harm.
The standard directly lists "no output" as a hazard (informatively in the annex), yet Tidge feels that no output is not a hazard but a failure to meet essential performance. (Not suggesting Tidge is wrong)
Device (un)availability is not a hazard. This is more appropriately considered in a failure to provide essential performance.
Would you consider the device being taken out of service as the hazardous situation? Or do you treat essential performance in a different manner?