D
-------Begin Snip-------
Subject: Re: Rear View Mirror Management
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1999 21:54:11 -0600
From: Jim McKinley
M.B.O. is a "focus on the results" method of management. Focus on watching process outputs and reacting to them when the results are not satisfactory (results do not fall within "M.B.O. specifications"). How can we improve a process by focus on results (too late when results have been produced)? Answer: we can't.
I'm not completely sure this is an accurate characterization, but it may well be...I'd have to look at the MBO material closely.
I integrated M.B.O. and M.B.R. (Management by Results) under M.B.O. in my description above, both are practiced together as a single method from my observations.
In the approach I describe (which is really a variation of MBO (that's not a fair characterization), the majority of time spent in the management process is spent, NOT looking in rear view mirror, but looking forward, identifying barriers, particularly process ones, (eg. variation) and addressing them.
If the "but looking forward,.... particularly process ones (eg. variation)" is focused on process outputs, this is what Dr. Tribus is describing (as I understand his meaning) as "looking in the rear view mirror." There is nothing wrong with studying process outputs, but studying outputs is not sufficient. Making decisions based on studying process outputs alone can lead rapidly to serious trouble. There is better management theory available.
If you look at the MBO position (I think) where it starts is with a "strategic planning" process that is FORWARD looking. However, you are correct that the flaw is an over-emphasis on the results, and too little on process.
I agree this can be what leaders are attempting to do (make predictions) using M.B.O., but the methods (M.B.O./M.B.R./variations on M.B.O.) are ill suited for making prediction. These is a nasty "surprise" leaders encounter in the processes they are attempting to make predictions about, Dr. Tribus has described this "surprise" well in his paper titled "The Germ Theory of Management."
upstream in the process(es), change our focus from the results to the causes of the results, "look out the front windshield". Confusing special causes of variation with common cause variation, taking action by making changes to the design of the process based on special causes (tampering) makes our results worse (increases the dispersion in the process and may shift the mean away from the desired target). Rule 2 and 4 of the funnel dominate the decision making processes of boardroom discussions I have witnessed.
I forgot a key word in a statement above, the statement should have read: "taking action on perceived special causes (tampering)"..... I was attempting to describe Shewhart's mistake 1 and missed the mark.
If you focus on the communication process between management and employees, you can use that process to "form the bedrock" to look at both special and common causes, I think. The system I describe is meant to do that.
Improving communication in organizations is very important, but I don't understand how this as a basis to "look at both special and common causes." Could you tell us what you mean when you use the terms "special cause" and "common cause?" I suspect there may be a different meaning for the terms used by different people in the thread this topic came from.
I relate this to attempting adjustments (steering wheel) in the course of our car while looking behind us, taking action on the process without knowledge of the variation (causal system) in the process.
This is deceptively limiting. Is it possible to steer based on our aim, taking into account where we have been in error in past situations?
These are very useful theories which can be integrated as a system "to steer toward the aim."
Of course. Data analysis, and charting data is based on what has happened, yes? We correct our system based, on both aim and our knowledge of the data.
TNE 2nd Ed., page 100:
"Use of data requires knowledge about the different sources of uncertainty. Measurement is a process. Is the system of measurement stable or unstable? Use of data requires also the understanding of the distinction between enumerative studies and analytical problems. An enumerative study produces information about a frame. The theory of sampling and design of experiments are enumerative studies. Our Census is an enumerative study. Another example is a shipload of iron ore. Buyer and seller need to know how much iron is on board.
The interpretation of the results of a test or an experiment is something else. It is predication that a specific change in a process or procedure will be a wise choice, or that no change would be better. Either way the choice is a prediction. This is known as an analytical problem, or a problem of inference, prediction."
Jim McKinley
-------End Snip-------
The DEN has been quiet on this one, therefore your folks input would be appreciated.
Regards,
Don
Subject: Re: Rear View Mirror Management
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1999 21:54:11 -0600
From: Jim McKinley
M.B.O. is a "focus on the results" method of management. Focus on watching process outputs and reacting to them when the results are not satisfactory (results do not fall within "M.B.O. specifications"). How can we improve a process by focus on results (too late when results have been produced)? Answer: we can't.
I'm not completely sure this is an accurate characterization, but it may well be...I'd have to look at the MBO material closely.
I integrated M.B.O. and M.B.R. (Management by Results) under M.B.O. in my description above, both are practiced together as a single method from my observations.
In the approach I describe (which is really a variation of MBO (that's not a fair characterization), the majority of time spent in the management process is spent, NOT looking in rear view mirror, but looking forward, identifying barriers, particularly process ones, (eg. variation) and addressing them.
If the "but looking forward,.... particularly process ones (eg. variation)" is focused on process outputs, this is what Dr. Tribus is describing (as I understand his meaning) as "looking in the rear view mirror." There is nothing wrong with studying process outputs, but studying outputs is not sufficient. Making decisions based on studying process outputs alone can lead rapidly to serious trouble. There is better management theory available.
If you look at the MBO position (I think) where it starts is with a "strategic planning" process that is FORWARD looking. However, you are correct that the flaw is an over-emphasis on the results, and too little on process.
I agree this can be what leaders are attempting to do (make predictions) using M.B.O., but the methods (M.B.O./M.B.R./variations on M.B.O.) are ill suited for making prediction. These is a nasty "surprise" leaders encounter in the processes they are attempting to make predictions about, Dr. Tribus has described this "surprise" well in his paper titled "The Germ Theory of Management."
upstream in the process(es), change our focus from the results to the causes of the results, "look out the front windshield". Confusing special causes of variation with common cause variation, taking action by making changes to the design of the process based on special causes (tampering) makes our results worse (increases the dispersion in the process and may shift the mean away from the desired target). Rule 2 and 4 of the funnel dominate the decision making processes of boardroom discussions I have witnessed.
I forgot a key word in a statement above, the statement should have read: "taking action on perceived special causes (tampering)"..... I was attempting to describe Shewhart's mistake 1 and missed the mark.
If you focus on the communication process between management and employees, you can use that process to "form the bedrock" to look at both special and common causes, I think. The system I describe is meant to do that.
Improving communication in organizations is very important, but I don't understand how this as a basis to "look at both special and common causes." Could you tell us what you mean when you use the terms "special cause" and "common cause?" I suspect there may be a different meaning for the terms used by different people in the thread this topic came from.
I relate this to attempting adjustments (steering wheel) in the course of our car while looking behind us, taking action on the process without knowledge of the variation (causal system) in the process.
This is deceptively limiting. Is it possible to steer based on our aim, taking into account where we have been in error in past situations?
These are very useful theories which can be integrated as a system "to steer toward the aim."
Of course. Data analysis, and charting data is based on what has happened, yes? We correct our system based, on both aim and our knowledge of the data.
TNE 2nd Ed., page 100:
"Use of data requires knowledge about the different sources of uncertainty. Measurement is a process. Is the system of measurement stable or unstable? Use of data requires also the understanding of the distinction between enumerative studies and analytical problems. An enumerative study produces information about a frame. The theory of sampling and design of experiments are enumerative studies. Our Census is an enumerative study. Another example is a shipload of iron ore. Buyer and seller need to know how much iron is on board.
The interpretation of the results of a test or an experiment is something else. It is predication that a specific change in a process or procedure will be a wise choice, or that no change would be better. Either way the choice is a prediction. This is known as an analytical problem, or a problem of inference, prediction."
Jim McKinley
-------End Snip-------
The DEN has been quiet on this one, therefore your folks input would be appreciated.
Regards,
Don