Boeing new issue with 777X engine support

[optomist1]

True this is part of the break, repair, design change...process, don't know that there is a point at least from my perspective, other than, now Boeing is reportedly, self-reporting developments, that in the recent past they may have missed or at least not reported?

 

[Tidge]

Here is a freebie for the Quality Intern assigned to the investigation:

"Dear engineer, what made you think that the part wouldn't crack?"

 

[Bev D]

Yeah - it’s mostly about the idea that is shouldn’t have cracked - but it is good that they tested for it and found it and reported it.
But that will result in increasing profit pressure as the program is already very delayed and with the starliner stuck in space that puts a big squeeze on Boing. Not that they don’t deserve it but it could result in even dumber decisions.

 

[Sidney Vianna]

But that will result in increasing profit pressure as the program is already very delayed

That’s true but they know BCA cannot afford another fiasco at this time. After the 737 Max debacle, I suspect the 777X certification program is most scrutinized in history, both internally and also by the FAA.

 

[Wes Bucey]

Wes! I haven't seen you here in a long time.

My dad was a Manufacturing Engineer for Boeing back in the mid 1970s. I remember overhearing him griping about management way back then. It seems it is ever thus.

I had a guy working for me who had worked for Boeing investigating failures including crashes . They fired him; he was too good. He had what we called then Asberger's. Today we call it "high end of the autism spectrum." It was sweet revenge for him when his investigation on our issue cost Boeing tens of thousands in penalties. We let him deliver the news in person.

 

[Wes Bucey]

From the information posted above...
The thrust link in question transfers thrust from the engine to the airframe.... there are two, one for redundancy in case one were to fail.

Makes me wonder...... if there are two, are they normally sharing the load, otherwise if one breaks (the one taking the full load) how is the full load transferred to the other one? If the load is normally shared between the two thrust links and one breaks, then the other is suddenly taking twice its normal load (and hence may be more prone to failure too?). There must be more to this than meets the eye, so to speak

Your post is well thought, but perhaps not deep enough. Let's get at root cause. Was FMEA as thorough as to consider "What happens if one strut fails in mid flight? Will 'redundant' strut be able to handle the sudden shock?" My purpose in the post is multifaceted.
1) I like digging at the arrogance of Boeing
2) The importance of FMEA in planning and design
3 the importance of double checking materials for strength and assuring vendor documentation is not fiction, (I recall a case where one vendor just xeroxed old test reports on titanium bars with new dates to save money on metallurgy lab fees. Only caught when parts made from those bars failed in use.)

The concept is there are tests for design and strength of materials to be done BEFORE they're made into an aircraft and flown. Were they done? Were they sufficiently rigorous to assure safe use?

 

[Wes Bucey]

Long ago, I wrote a series of posts about the business of being a true consultant. One point was knowing when and why to turn down a contract. A major reason was avoiding a FUBAR situation that would taint your own reputation. For me, Boeing is a FUBAR situation simply because the executive culture refuses to accept responsibility and seeks to blame everyone else for their failures in leadership and commitment. Here's a new whistleblower account:
Boeing whistleblower from Seattle Times.
Message me if it doesn't open or is behind a paywall.

 

[Wes Bucey]

The Whistleblower account mentions MISCOMMUNICATION, one of the reasons for SoPK in an organization. SoPK is lacking in Boeing which keeps secrets and maintains departments and vendors in isolated silos.

 

[optomist1]

Long ago, I wrote a series of posts about the business of being a true consultant. One point was knowing when and why to turn down a contract. A major reason was avoiding a FUBAR situation that would taint your own reputation. For me, Boeing is a FUBAR situation simply because the executive culture refuses to accept responsibility and seeks to blame everyone else for their failures in leadership and commitment. Here's a new whistleblower account:
Boeing whistleblower from Seattle Times.
Message me if it doesn't open or is behind a paywall.

Great post Wes...and to certain, in relative terms (from experience) "fixing a mfg. process", is simple compared to fundamentally changing a culture gone awry.

A brief but timely vignette..a former automotive executive turned college professor, my college professor...shared many an instance where vaunted "change agents" were brought in to well, change to the corporate culture. He described those instance as analogous to a germ entering a human being...the result the establishment (white blood cells) unceremoniously attacked and rejected the Germ/Change agent.

Hopefully, for so many reasons, this is not the case with BA!

 

[Ronen E]

From the information posted above...
The thrust link in question transfers thrust from the engine to the airframe.... there are two, one for redundancy in case one were to fail.

Makes me wonder...... if there are two, are they normally sharing the load, otherwise if one breaks (the one taking the full load) how is the full load transferred to the other one? If the load is normally shared between the two thrust links and one breaks, then the other is suddenly taking twice its normal load (and hence may be more prone to failure too?). There must be more to this than meets the eye, so to speak

In general engineering terms (and I'm no aircraft engineer, just a run-of-the-mill mech eng by training), this is not how redundancy is supposed to work. Redundancy would mean each would be designed to carry the entire load on its own, and then some (safety factoring). So in theory it should be able to survive the loss of its mate. Yes, there might be a shock effect due to the sudden increase in load (going from about half the load, in this case, to full load), but I'd expect the esteemed aircraft design engineers to account for that, too.

The main issue (in general) is accurately identifying the "real" nominal load (against which redundancy is applied). Obviously, not a simple task at all, in any critical-function engineering design job. If the nominated design load + applied safety factors deviate vastly from the actual loads (+ any effects not accounted for), redundancy might hide the deficiency for a while, and then, when one of the redundant members fails (for whatever reason - could e.g. be a microscopic manufacturing flaw), catastrophic failure of the entire set might soon follow.