S
samsung
I can't agree to the 'summary' any more without valid supporting evidences.
However, I've got the answer and have nothing to ask further, so far as this thread is concerned.
I can't agree to the 'summary' any more without valid supporting evidences.
However, I've got the answer and have nothing to ask further, so far as this thread is concerned.
S
samsung
Thats fine. Same here - I cant agree too.
Ofcourse, it's your prerogative to disagreeing to anything even without citing anything in support to justify your disagreement. But, as for me, I have given enough evidences as to why I can't agree to something.
Meanwhile, thanks for taking time to replying to the post.
Sorry I can not agree further as I have provided enough justification and examples earlier in this thread ...
I think it's possible to overthink this to the point of becoming frozen or explain away a reason to come up short of what would be effective. To understand it in full context, we can apply Plan-Do-Check-Act in safety systems also.
Planning the system to avoid nonconformances that result in accidents, including how to capture and record data that will help understand results.
Doing the things we planned in the way they were planned, including data capture. This also includes accident investigations data, which I am placing in the "Do" category because accidents typically aren't part of the planned system. They are consequences of things gone amiss. Since I wouldn't want to wait for management review to correct a systemic problem if it presents imminent risk, corrections can happen in this part. In other words, "Doing" includes the "Planned" nonconformance process, one which ideally exists within management circles and doesn't rely on an internal auditor to raise an issue for action.
Examining the data to understand what needs to be improved upon systemically. This is done with periodic routine checks. Management can use this chance to plan capital or systemic improvements that, through careful review, they determine will be effective in preventing nonconformances that result in accidents. This might even include adding a specialist to provide expertise and manage what they decide they can't, or choose not to do on their own.
Acting on what was learned means applying the learning systemically, to raise the bar a little and trend down the incidents and accidents that can be quite expensive to deal with. An example is in fall protection. If an accident happened on the loading docks, a robust P-D-C-A action would include improving fall protection systems on the docks, but also elsewhere in the organization; it might include training, buying equipment like harnesses and installing railings. It might even involve rearranging the work flow to avoid activities that are particularly risky - finding a new, smarter way to get the work done.
The standard does tell us to do these things, just not in the words I used. Doing these things would also help protect from the kinds of mega-$million fines that, for example British Petroleum was assigned following their Texas plant blast some years ago. In their case it wasn't just the accident that did it; their fines resulted in investigation showing their Plan-Do-Check-Act had been hollowed out to the point of being just a slogan.
Planning the system to avoid nonconformances that result in accidents, including how to capture and record data that will help understand results.
Doing the things we planned in the way they were planned, including data capture. This also includes accident investigations data, which I am placing in the "Do" category because accidents typically aren't part of the planned system. They are consequences of things gone amiss. Since I wouldn't want to wait for management review to correct a systemic problem if it presents imminent risk, corrections can happen in this part. In other words, "Doing" includes the "Planned" nonconformance process, one which ideally exists within management circles and doesn't rely on an internal auditor to raise an issue for action.
Examining the data to understand what needs to be improved upon systemically. This is done with periodic routine checks. Management can use this chance to plan capital or systemic improvements that, through careful review, they determine will be effective in preventing nonconformances that result in accidents. This might even include adding a specialist to provide expertise and manage what they decide they can't, or choose not to do on their own.
Acting on what was learned means applying the learning systemically, to raise the bar a little and trend down the incidents and accidents that can be quite expensive to deal with. An example is in fall protection. If an accident happened on the loading docks, a robust P-D-C-A action would include improving fall protection systems on the docks, but also elsewhere in the organization; it might include training, buying equipment like harnesses and installing railings. It might even involve rearranging the work flow to avoid activities that are particularly risky - finding a new, smarter way to get the work done.
The standard does tell us to do these things, just not in the words I used. Doing these things would also help protect from the kinds of mega-$million fines that, for example British Petroleum was assigned following their Texas plant blast some years ago. In their case it wasn't just the accident that did it; their fines resulted in investigation showing their Plan-Do-Check-Act had been hollowed out to the point of being just a slogan.
Frankly I don't know what all the fuss was all about anyway. Why would you care what to call it? The real question is what are you going to do about it?
S
samsung
Infact, as I mentioned earlier, it's the requirement of our workmen in whose opinion, titling 'accidents' (incidents) as NC's would render them 'less significant' in terms of catching management attention especially towards allocation of adequate resources (budget, equipment, manpower etc.) for implementing the suggested mitigation measures.
It was only accidental that they were reported as NC's by a novice and it's how the issue sparked fires in the safety meeting. This is true that we always recognize & report 'accidents' as they are; not as NC's since one is legally bound to report all the accidents (as they are) to the concerned regulatory authorities wherever they are and as a matter of fact, I can't imagine creating two documents (one for regulators and another for OHSAS auditors) having the same contents but with different nomenclatures.
Thanks to all, but especially to Randy & Jennifer for sharing their valuable thoughts in this thread.
S
samsung
I'm sure you don't mean what you have said else you could have used these words in your first response just to end the story; then and there.
I just assumed that the forum is meant for asking questions, discussing the intricacies involved and putting up 'logical opinions' and infact, you can see, this is what I did.
Randy
Super Moderator
What ever an accident or incident is called, it still has to be investigated, cause determined, solution developed and implemented and verified for effectiveness as well as whatever the problem it has to be mitigated.
It doesn't matter what it's called, who did it or how it happened the process is the same........Move on and get it done.
It doesn't matter what it's called, who did it or how it happened the process is the same........Move on and get it done.
Similar threads
